This article looks at whether the principle of technology neutrality can be applied to the centralised-decentralised scale in a manner similar to its application to the offline-online scale. The analysis is based on two cases of similar circumstances relating to bitcoin exchanges run by early adopters in Estonia and Sweden. The cases exhibit two different ex ante legislative approaches aimed at payments in currencies and the interpretation of the respective legislation by the judiciary in applying these rules to bitcoins and to the activity of exchanging bitcoins. The article examines whether the legal rules applied to the payment infrastructure of currencies were technology neutral and also implemented neutrally or whether, contrary to the principle, there was difference of treatment of decentralised technology outputs -bitcoins -from the centralised technology outputs -legal tenderirrelevant of the functional equivalence of these units of payment.
INTRODUCTION
In 2008 a character by the name of Satoshi Nakamoto released a White Paper describing the need for "an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third party". 1 In 2009, supposedly the same character also released an open-source peer-to-peer software code that is based on a complex algorithm and secured by cryptography. 2 The software was called Bitcoin.
The software offered an alternative decentralised e-payment infrastructure operating without a trusted third party such as a bank. The software protocol allows its users to create, record and transfer units of value, now referred to as a virtual currency 3 called bitcoin. In a way, the Bitcoin payment software creates a new global decentralised infrastructure for transferring value similar to money without the involvement of centralised intermediaries.
Blockchain technology underpins the Bitcoin software protocol. Various applications for blockchain technology ranging from Bitcoin and other virtual currencies to shareholder voting, smart contract systems, etc. already exist or are being developed. Blockchain technology is not the end of the line but merely one of many similar technologies that might be referred to as decentralised, trustless or distributed ledger technologies. 4 This article introduces the functioning of blockchain technology only for the purpose of helping to understand the infrastructural difference between centralised and decentralised payment systems and the comparative functions of payment with a fiat currency as opposed to bitcoin. 5 
PAYMENT SYSTEMS BASED ON CENTRALISED AND DECENTRALISED

TECHNOLOGY
For the purposes of this article 'fiat currency' means the legal tender of a jurisdiction issued under the law by way of a centralised process and authority, while the meaning of 'virtual currency' stems from the 5 th AML Directive 8 :
A digital representation of value that is not issued or guaranteed by a central bank or a public authority, is not necessarily attached to a legally established currency and does not possess a legal status of currency or money, but is accepted by natural or legal persons as a means of exchange and which can be transferred, stored and traded electronically.
Already in June 2014 the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) stated that:
Virtual currency is distinguished from fiat currency (a.k.a. 'real currency', 'real money', or 'national currency'), which is the coin and paper money of a country that is designated as its legal tender; circulates; and is customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in the issuing country. It is distinct from emoney, which is a digital representation of a fiat currency used to electronically transfer value denominated in the fiat currency. E-money is a digital transfer mechanism for fiat currency -i.e., it electronically transfers value that has legal tender status. 9 The different treatment of a fiat currency 10 and a virtual currency can be attributed to the fact that (i) the fiat currency is also available in its tangible form (the actual coins and cash) and (ii) it is issued by a centralised system -both technological and legal issuance processes are established by law and different from the issuance process of the virtual currencies.
It should be noted that 92% of the world's money is already in a non-physical form. 11 For instance, according to IMF, 86% of banknotes in India were scrapped as recent as in 2017 12 and Korea plans to stop minting and circulating coins already by 2020. 13 As a result of the popularity of e-commerce, credit cards, mobile payments and online banking, the role of money has predominantly diffused to payments. Going even further, the digital world is no longer concerned with money 8 5 th AML Directive, supra note 3. 9 FATF, "Virtual Currencies Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks" (June 2014) // http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf. 10 According to Recital 8 of 5 th AML Directive fiat currency is "coins and banknotes that are designated as legal tender and electronic money, of a country, accepted as a medium of exchange in the issuing country" (5 th AML Directive, supra note 3). 11 Sue Chang, "Here's all the money in the world, in one chart," MarketWatch.com (28 November 2017) // https://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-is-how-much-money-exists-in-the-entire-world-in-onechart-2015-12-18. 12 Ibid. 13 The main components of the blockchain technology based decentralised Bitcoin system are: (i) the virtual currency bitcoin, (ii) the software protocol Bitcoin and (iii) nodes operating the software protocol (also called 'miners'). The main function of the decentralised Bitcoin system is to facilitate payment transactions between users of the Bitcoin system (those who accept it as a value and means of either payment or exchange). Usually, at least two parties are involved in a payment transaction: the one who makes the payment and the one who receives the payment. Each user of the protocol has a pair of cryptographic keys: a public key that also operates as the "account address" and a private or secret key. The public key encrypts and the private key decrypts. The private key grants the user access to the value recorded in the public ledger and allows for transferring bitcoins to another user. With each payment the sender creates a payment message which is also called 'transaction,' which contains the recipient's public key and the payment amount. The transaction is cryptographically processed by the sender's private key similar to digital signatures.
The transaction is visible in a decentralised public ledger that is available to everyone and copied by each node. 14 The primary way of participating in the Bitcoin infrastructure is by mining 15 coins. Those who do not mine coins need to get access to the infrastructure by obtaining an entry ticket -a bitcoin -through other means (i) either by buying it from a miner or an exchange service provider who sells bitcoins for a fiat currency or (ii) by earning bitcoins by selling goods or services to those willing to provide bitcoins as a means of payment.
The article looks at two court cases of bitcoin exchange service providers in 14 In the context of Bitcoin system according to https://bitnodes.earn.com/ as of 15 April 2018 there are 10,520 nodes operating the Bitcoin system around the world with the most of these in the US (2600 nodes), Germany (1991 nodes) and China (694 nodes). 15 Bitcoin mining is done by the full nodes as they verify or confirm the transactions by compiling the transactions into blocks of transactions and thereby adding these to the public ledger of transactions called the blockchain.
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accepting currencies for trading. In many ways these exchanges are similar to foreign fiat currency exchange platforms.
For the purpose of understanding the legal challenges arising from centralised and decentralised currencies, the VAT Committee's 16 earlier opinions on bitcoins before the Hedqvist case and the de Voogd case should be discussed as well.
In the VAT Committee's working papers, the discussions on the qualification of bitcoins under ex ante legislation touch upon the following options: (i) currency;
(ii) electronic money; (iii) voucher; (iv) negotiable instrument; (v) security, or (vi) digital product (or also referred to as electronically supplied service) 17 . These are all pre-existing legal categories. At the time of Hedqvist, no sui generis category such as virtual currency had been developed yet.
However, if one compares the functions of a fiat currency and bitcoin as used up to and during Hedqvist, the functional equivalence of the two objects is clearly apparent as both were used for payments by their user. In the respective VAT Committee's analysis "electronic money" and "currency" category were disregarded due to the fact that "in electronic money schemes, the link with traditional money forms is preserved, as the stored funds are expressed in the same unit of account (Euro, for example)" and "as bitcoin is not a legal tender". This conclusion was drawn regardless of the fact that Recitals 7 and 8 of the E-money Directive 18 were promoting a technically neutral definition of electronic money "to avoid hampering technological innovation and to cover not only all the electronic money products available today in the market but also those products which could be developed in the future". However, as demonstrated below, the neutrality of the term "electronic money" might need to be revisited soon. 19 This means that the Committee identified the functional equivalence between the use of a fiat currency and the use of a bitcoin, yet, disregarding it.
For the purposes of this article the necessity to have a "legal tender" status for a payment unit qualifies as the technology-specific part of the legal rule as it requires for any means of payment to have a centralised issuing and validation process. Furthermore, as the decentralised characteristics of bitcoin are related to its issuing technology (peer-to-peer value issued by a protocol), the ground for non-equivalent treatment of the unit by the legal rules or the implementation of these was based on a technological difference of the payment unit from the legal tender.
FACTS OF THE CASES DE VOOGD AND HEDQVIST
In view of the above, an overview of the factual circumstances of the cases under examination will be provided, along with the exploration of the principle used in analysing these cases.
DE VOOGD V FIU
According to the order of the Estonian Supreme Court, 20 identifying customers (CDD) and verifying their identities (EDD).
The legal rule in the centre of the dispute was Section 6(4) of the MLPA. 23 The
Act regulated both who qualified as an obligated person under the MLPA and the obligations of the obligated persons. The MLPA in force at the time introduced a sui generis category called "alternative means of payment service provider"
(hereinafter also referred to as alternative currency service provider), which was defined as:
A person who in its economic or professional activities through communications, transfer or clearing system buys, sells or mediates funds of monetary value by which financial obligations can be performed or which can be exchanged for an official currency who is not a [credit institution] or a financial institution for the purposes of the Credit Institutions Act.
24
Neither the term "communications, transfer or clearing system" nor "funds of monetary value" was defined under Estonian law.
As indicated in the explanatory memorandum 25 Under the MLPA in force at the time, where a person was regarded as an alternative currency service provider, the person had the duty to identify the customer (i.e. apply CDD procedures) and verify the customer's identity (i.e. apply 23 The version of the MLPA is already repealed and a new MLPA entered into force 27 November 2017. 24 MLPA, Section 6(4). 25 Both the provider of fiat currency exchange services and a provider of alternative currency services were obligated persons under the MLPA. 27 The term 27 MLPA, Section 6(2). 28 MLPA, Section 6(3). 29 MLPA, Section 12(2). 30 The case was covered globally in the media and the case materials are available on the site www.btc.ee maintained by the claimant de Voogd.
ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 11, NUMBER 2 2018 71 issuing any sanctions. A few months after the order on July 16, 2016 31 deletion of the face-to-face requirement entered into force and more than a year after this order all the rules on the alternative currency were repealed by the legislature replacing these with a new sui generis category of virtual currency.
SKATTEVERKET V HEDQVIST
David Hedqvist (Hedqvist), a Swedish national, planned to carry out electronic transactions on his company's website in a way that his company would purchase and sell bitcoins directly from and to individuals, companies and exchange sites. The questions that were referred to the CJEU were: ii. If so, must Article 135 (1) of the VAT Directive be interpreted as meaning that the abovementioned exchange transactions are tax exempt? 37 The CJEU answered both questions referred to it in the affirmative. According to the CJEU, bitcoin is "a direct means of payment between the operators that accept it" 38 and:
It must be held, first, that the 'bitcoin' virtual currency with bidirectional flow, which will be exchanged for traditional currencies in the context of exchange transactions, cannot be characterised as 'tangible property' within the meaning of Article 14 of the VAT Directive, given … that virtual currency has no purpose other than to be a means of payment. The German version used the term 'Devisen', meaning only foreign currencies, which meant that the German version required both means of payment involved in the exchange to be legal tenders -e.g. fiat currencies. The Italian and Finnish versions did not even require that any of the currencies be legal tender, meaning 37 Ibid. 38 VAT Committee, supra note 17: 4. 39 Skatteverket v David Hedqvist, supra note 32, point 24.
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that also non-legal tenders such as virtual currencies could be covered by that
Article.
40
The Court agreed with the AG´s opinion and confirmed the understanding that virtual currencies -without being legal tender -"are a means of payment accepted by the parties to a transaction, and vice versa" 41 and stated that by excluding these from Article 135(1)(e) effect would limit the Article's scope as "'bitcoin' virtual currency has no other purpose than to be a means of payment and that it is accepted for that purpose by certain operators." 42
THE PRINCIPLE OF TECHNOLOGY NEUTRALITY
The principle of technology neutrality is based on the liberalisation of the telecommunications market both in the US and in Europe and on the idea that there should be equality between "offline" and "online" world. 43 The principle is also based on the value and aim to secure "statutory longevity" 44 or sustainability of
laws. Yet, the principle is not meant only for the telecoms sector. According to Chris
Reed, "the key factor in persuading legislators that technology neutrality should be adopted more widely was the advent of the internet for general public use."
In July 1997, President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore framed the principle in the Framework for Global Electronic Commerce stating that: "rules should be technology neutral (i.e., the rules should neither require nor assume a particular technology) and forward looking (i.e., the rules should not hinder the use or development of technologies in the future)." 45 Soon after that the concept ventured into European law 46 as described below.
EU LAW AND CASE LAW
As the principle is based on ideas of anti-discrimination and equality, the foundations of the principle can be also found in the general principle of equal treatment provided for in on the bank account -these are merely different media.
The CJEU case law on these issues is inconsistent and the Court does not mention the principle of technology neutrality in these debates. The most noteworthy case where the CJEU upheld the principle of technology neutrality (without referring to it specifically) was UsedSoft. 64 In it the CJEU recognised the consumer's ownership right to downloaded software extending the principle of exhaustion from physical products to also digital goods under the Software Directive. 65 As the CJEU stated:
It makes no difference, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, whether the copy of the computer program was made available to the customer by the rightholder concerned by means of a download from the rightholder's website or by means of a material medium such as a CD-ROM or DVD. One key point is that the principle does not call for extending the legislation applicable to any pre-existing technology to a "new" technology that achieves the same purpose service-wise. 81 According to Kamecke and Körber, the principle actually argues for self-regulation as much as possible and does not force the judiciary or the executive to extend the ex ante legal rules to any new technology simply because it achieves a similar purpose. This idea has been included also in , the principle has the following aims:
1.
Functional equivalence -the state should not discriminate between different modes of activity or technology (e.g. offline and online modes) in case these modes have the same or similar functions.
2.
Effects equivalence -legal rules introduced must have a substantively equivalent effect across technologies even if there is technology-specific legislation in place (according to Reed this is also called "implementation neutrality"
86
).
An additional criterion of the principle is the aim of transparency, which dictates that legislation must be understandable to the ordinary person, and may not be full of technical jargon or specifications, yet at the same time the more abstract the laws become, the less transparent these are as it becomes unclear what technology falls within the scope of legislation.
Furthermore, an additional aim of the principle is the sustainability or sometimes also referred to as the futureproofing or statutory longevity of the law, the purpose of which is that laws should be drafted in a way that they are flexible enough in order not to impede future development of technology and that laws
should not require over-frequent revision by the state in order to cope with technological change. A characteristic of these additional aims and criteria is that "higher"-level laws can be more abstract and sustainable than "lower"-level gapfilling decrees, guidelines, orders, etc. that may be less sustainable (subsidiarity principle 
CRITICISM OF THE PRINCIPLE
The obvious criticism of the principle is the tendency of neutral rules to be too vague and general to the extent that their meaning and intent remains unclear to its subjects, making the application of the rule "a matter of guesswork" 90 and the rule non-transparent. Considering, for example, the definition of electronic money in the E-money Directive using semi-neutral terminology such as "stored on 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS: MEASURING AND DISCUSSING THE INTER-MUNICIPAL COOPERATION CAPACITY
In the following section the principle of technology neutrality is applied to the text of the provisions under dispute in de Voogd and Hedqvist, and to the interpretation of these provisions in these cases by the executive and the judiciary.
At the time when Europe was struggling under the Digital Single Market agenda to establish equal treatment to digital and physical goods 98 (offline-online spectrum equality), the main question in de Voogd and Hedqvist was whether a virtual currency should be treated equally to a fiat currency.
The analysis of the two cases below will be based on the following two questions:
Was the text of the legal rule technology neutral?
Was the interpretation and implementation of the legal rule technology neutral?
APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE IN HEDQVIST
In this section, the principle of technology neutrality is applied to the legal rule applied and the arguments used by the CJEU in the Hedqvist case.
a) Was the text of the legal rule technology neutral?
For this purpose, the text of Article 135(1)(e) of the VAT Directive needs to be looked at. It follows from the facts of the case that the wording of the referred provision was ambiguous and the meaning was not transparent. In some language
versions the text was neutral to "currencies" issued using centralised or decentralised technology and in some language versions it was not neutral.
95 Anna Butenko and Pierre Larouche, supra note 7. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Janja Hojnik, supra note 62.
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Therefore, it was unclear in the context of the neutrality of the "means of payment"
whether the provision covered only centralised means of payment or also decentralised ones.
b) Was the interpretation and implementation of the legal rule technology neutral?
According to the Advocate General Kokott 99 (AG) in Hedqvist:
Currencies currently used as legal tender -unlike gold or cigarettes, for instance, which also are or have been used directly or indirectly as means of payment -have no other practical use than as a means of payment. Their function in a transaction is simply to facilitate trade in goods in an economy; as such, however, they are not consumed or used as goods.
That which applies for legal tender should also apply for other means of payment with no other function than to serve as such. Even though such pure means of payment are not guaranteed and supervised by law, for VAT purposes they perform the same function as legal tender and as such must, in accordance with the principle of fiscal neutrality in the form of the principle of equal treatment, be treated in the same way."
100
This means that the Hedqvist decision was based on the functional equivalence of virtual currency (bitcoin) and fiat currency (legal tender). Hence, the ex ante legislation was implemented in a technology neutral manner. The rule, i.e.
Article 135(1)(e), 101 is not necessarily worded neutrally in the English version, but the implementation of the rule by the CJEU in this particular case was technology neutral. The AG argued that this interpretation was also consistent with treatment of other non-traditional "means of payment" such as voucher or loyalty "points"
(used in purchasing flight tickets, accommodation, etc).
The AG concluded that "it follows that the objective of Article 135(1)(e) of the VAT Directive is to ensure that, in the interests of the smooth flow of payments, the conversion of currencies is as unencumbered as possible." 102 Consequently, the AG did not distinguish legal tenders from non-legal tenders and accepted that, as long as these are payment transactions which fulfil a payment function, these transactions fell under the exemption of Article 135 (1) function and the legislations effect should be the same) and transparency -all these arguments are also part of the technology neutrality principle. This meant the equal treatment of a fiat currency and a virtual currency on the grounds of neutrality 103 as "both forms of means of payment, provided … accepted in the course of trade, perform the same payment function." 104 The principle of technology neutrality stipulated that a user not government must make the choices on the market and this function-based implementation of VAT Directive achieving equivalence in effects is arguing exactly for that.
The Court agreed with the AG´s opinion and arguments, and also emphasised that it "follows from the context and the aims of Article 135(1)(e) that to interpret that provision as including only transactions involving traditional currencies would deprive it of part of its effect." 
APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE IN DE VOOGD
This section addresses the application of technology neutrality principle to the ex ante rules and the interpretation of these rules in de Voogd.
a) Was the text of the legal rule technology neutral?
The relevant rule was worded rather broadly, containing practically no legal definition or defined terms. The rule aimed at encompassing all possible "Internet money" and was therefore worded in a neutral and sustainable manner. However, the effect of placing bitcoin in the sui generis category of alternative currency had a discriminatory impact on its treatment in comparison with a fiat currency under the MLPA.
In the context of transfers of "Internet money," the legislature had chosen to restrict transactions with this means of payment, although the legislature recognised its similar functions with fiat currency different characteristics. The legislation was simply aimed at limiting, restricting and prohibiting these transactions as these were seen carrying a risk of criminal activity.
The MLPA was in force in 8 different versions during the period from the start The legislature was tuned into the harms of money laundering and wished to address only these potential harms without exploring the potential benefits of the use of the technology. Consequently, the impact assessment on the existing MLPA rule's effect on bitcoin received its first analysis by the FIU (as an executive branch)
and then by the judiciary in de Voogd.
One could conclude that, given the Collingridge dilemma and the knowledge the legislature had at the time of drafting the legal rules, the legislation suffered from information failure as the legislature clearly did not have sufficient information. The legislature wanting to control and influence the development of this innovation took the reins early and actually did put a warning sign in placethis is regulated and will be regulated in the future as well. Although it can be argued that the communication (and perhaps also internal know-how by the 106 The E-residency programme was lobbying alternatives to face-to-face meetings to ease the opening of bank accounts in Estonian commercial banks for e-residents and these amendment to MLPA originate from that package ( The effects the identification requirement (face-to-face) has on bitcoin salepurchase transactions are not clear enough and it is also not clear whether an individual who is a provider of this service has any sufficient means at all for the identification, collection and recording of this data.
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In essence this means that the Supreme Court is applying the principle of technology neutrality in the post scriptum assessing transparency, subsidiarity, effects equivalence, etc.
In the final point 116 in the de Voogd order, instead of taking any action itself, the Court urged the legislature to consider amending the duties of alternative currency service providers so that these would take into account the cross-border characteristics of bitcoin transactions (i.e. the technological features) and ensure sufficient flexibility of the legislation. This means that the Supreme Court was asking the legislature to apply the principle of technology neutrality upon redrafting the rule but did not apply the principle itself in de Voogd. In Hedqvist the Skatteverket and the Revenue Law Commission's understanding of the applicable rule was different and that the Supreme Administrative Court in Sweden did not consider the VAT Directive to be acte clair on the matter. The correct course of action, therefore, was to ask the regional authority to make it clear on the basis of a request for a preliminary ruling. The CJEU's ruling in the Hedqvist case clarified the legal practise and created more legal certainty in relation to virtual currencies in EU. In de Voogd, fiat currency exchange was treated differently from alternative currency exchange, but in Hedqvist these were treated exactly the same. In de Voogd there was a technology neutral rule for a sui generis category of alternative means of payment; however, it was not technology neutral, given the centraliseddecentralised scale. Although it can be argued that this was in line with Koops' idea of "higher" legislation such as legal acts having to be more technology neutral and abstract, the MLPA actually lacked the "lower" implementation guidelines, case law, executive branch explanations, etc., which could have increased legal clarity and perhaps adjusted proportionality to the respective rule.
The function of bitcoin was the same in both cases, yet, in Hedqvist there was no differentiation of treatment between these analysed means of payment and in 
